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Towards a Typology of Non-State Actors in ‘Hybrid Warfare’: Proxy, Auxiliary, 
Surrogate, and Affiliated Forces 
 
Vladimir Rauta  
School of Politics, Economics and International Relations, University of Reading 
v.rauta@reading.ac.uk  
 
Abstract: This article presents a typology of armed non-state actors that shape the military dimension of hybrid 
warfare: proxy, auxiliary, surrogate, and affiliated forces. By focusing on the kinetic domain of hybrid warfare, the 
article offers a corrective to a debate which has so far ignored variation in roles and functions of non-state actors and 
their relationships with internal and external states and their regular forces. As a denominator, ‘hybrid’ identifies a 
combination of battlespaces, types of operations – military or non-kinetic – and a blurring of actors with the scope 
of achieving strategic objectives by creating exploitable ambiguity. However, there has been a disproportionate focus 
on what hybrid war supposedly combines across battlespaces and domains (socio-political, economic, informational), 
at the expense of who and how this combination takes place. Using the Ukrainian crisis as a theory-building 
exercise, the article suggests a four-category schema that identifies non-state actor functions as a tool to better represent 
the complex franchise of violence that is found nested next to non-military operations in hybrid activity. In so doing, 
the article speaks to a call for better conceptualisation the role of non-state violent actors in civil war, in general, and 
in hybrid warfare, in particular.  
 




 In a recent article, Rory Cormac and Richard Aldrich remarked that ‘anxiety about 
ambiguous warfare and hybridity is all the rage’ (2018, 477). Taking the pulse of the debate on the 
hybridity of war and warfare, one can clearly see why: a concept that has been refuted by scholarly 
debate, yet embraced by policymakers and practitioners (Renz 2016; Renz and Smith 2016a; 
2016b); an ever-expanding terminological roster (Seely 2017); a rush for policy recommendations 
that has taken by surprise dormant NATO doctrines (Seely 2017; Oren 2016); and a reality of 
future warfare whether acknowledged as ‘hybrid’ or not (Freedman 2017).  
 The academic debate has reached a consensus that the notion of ‘hybrid war/warfare’ has 
to be approached cautiously. From outright rejection (Renz and Smith 2016a; 2016b; Charap 2015; 
Glenn 2009), to attempts at intellectually disentangling it from a supposed Russian way of war 
(Galeotti 2019, 2018a; Fridman 2018, 2017; Bartles 2016; Monaghan 2016; Thomas 2016; 
Thornton 2015), and to milder objections and acceptance (Almäng 2019; Caliskan 2019; Mälksoo 
2018; Jacob and Lasconjarias 2015; Schroefl and Kaufman 2014), we now know that ‘hybrid 
war/warfare’ is a conceptual trap. There is a high probability that no other concept in the semantic 
field of political violence today has had its intellectual credibility challenged in the way ‘hybrid 
war/warfare’ has – and rightly so. There is also little comparative evidence that other concepts 
reached the speed at which policymakers embraced and embedded ‘hybrid war’ into policy shortly 
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after the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 2014. As Samuel Charap noted, 
its prominence ‘surpassed all previous usage’ (2015, 51; Fridman 2018; Monaghan 2016; Renz 
2016)1.  
This article locates a problem in our understanding of the phenomenon, and one that has 
serious implications given the policy traction hybrid warfare has developed. It concerns the issue 
of armed non-state actors in the military domain of hybrid war/warfare and the roles they carry 
out in collaboration with, for, or alongside internal and external, official or semi-official forces. 
The following is a standard definition of ‘hybrid warfare’:  
 
‘The idea of hybrid warfare […] is seen, in essence, as a form of warfare characterised by 
‘blurring’. At its most basic level, the aim is to generate a situation where it is unclear whether a state of 
war exists – and if it does, who is a combatant and who is not’ (emphasis added, Thornton 2015, 
41).  
 
We know that as a denominator, ‘hybrid’ identifies a combination of battlespaces, types of 
operations – military or non-kinetic –, and a blurring of actors with the scope of achieving strategic 
objectives by creating ‘exploitable ambiguity’ (Cormac and Aldrich 2018, 490). Herein lies the 
problem this article tackles: there has been a disproportionate focus on what hybrid war supposedly combines 
across battlespaces, at the expense of who is combined and how this combination takes place. Simply put, we 
know that hybrid war has the capacity of combing armed action across all five domains of space, 
cyber, maritime, air, and land within wider campaigns involving politico-economic, socio-cultural, 
and informational dimensions (Lanoszka 2019, 2016). Yet, we know very little about the types, 
roles, and relationships involving actors both within and across these layers, outside claims about 
their regular-irregular nature and the synergy of their actions (Hoffman 2007).  
The article focuses on the ‘warfare’ layer of activity, no doubt the most problematic 
element of hybrid activity (Wigell 2019, 260). It understands ‘warfare’ in a very narrow sense as 
including military means amounting to armed interaction (Wigell 2019, 261), and in so doing it 
follows a turn in the literature towards disaggregating the layers, types, or dimensions of hybrid 
activity (Lanoszka 2019, Wigell 2019, Mälksoo 2018). The article’s aim is to better integrate 
explanations around the increasing range of armed non-state actors by focusing on their kinetic 
roles and relationships to other actors or parties in conflict. Specifically, it focuses their strategic 
roles vis-à-vis parties, regular and irregular, external and internal to the conflict waged under the 
                                                     
1 The same can be said for ‘asymmetric war/warfare’ in the aftermath of 9/11, and, more recently, about ‘cyber 
war/warfare’. I thank the reviewers for pointing this out. 
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‘hybrid’ label. It suggests a four-category schema that identifies non-state actor functions as a tool 
to better represent the complex franchise of violence that is found nested next to non-military 
operations. The article delineates between four strategic roles: proxy, surrogate, auxiliary, and 
affiliated.  
In so doing, the article speaks to a call for better conceptualisation of the role of violent 
non-state actors as one part of the wider and full-spectrum (economic, socio-political, informational) 
coercive efforts captured by hybrid campaigns. Recently, Robert Johnson criticised the hybrid 
debate for failing to grasp the nature of actors (2018, 147), and this article addresses this very issue 
by presenting a typology as an opportunity to minimise misconception and maximise theoretical 
progress. The article proceeds as follows. First, it locates the puzzle of the article in the current 
debate. Second, it introduces a four-category schema addressing the puzzle’s theoretical and 
empirical baseline. Third, it explores variation across the classification by referring to the Ukrainian 
crisis. The case study choice is informed by the article’s attempt at theory-building through 
typological developments (George and Bennett 2005, 238). The ‘little green men’, the separatist 
forces in the south east of Ukraine, the crowdfunding of Ukrainian volunteer battalions fighting 
to quash shadowy operations by Russian forces, private military contractors, and mercenaries, all 
obfuscated analytical categories as well as our ability to map their in situ relationships (Bowen 
2019; Spearin 2018; Galeotti 2016; Malyarenko and Galbreath 2016; Rauta 2016). Given this 
variation, a typology becomes an apt tool of management of phenomena complexity, working best 
in within case study scenarios (Gerring 2004, 92). Finally, the article concludes with a note on the 
importance of the discussion to scholarly and policy debates alike, and reviews some of the article’s 
limitations by outlining a path for further research. 
 
The Actor Problem in Hybrid Warfare Research  
 
The seizure of three small Ukrainian vessels and twenty-three sailors in the Kerch Strait 
linking the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea in November 2018, was the first overt armed conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Macfarquhar 2018). Reports 
immediately described the situation as another phase of the hybrid war Russia has been waging 
against Ukraine. One such case claimed that the incident added a new maritime dimension to 
Russia’s hybrid approach (Hall 2018), and the European Parliamentary Research Service was quick 
to locate the tensions in the overall Russian hybrid war effort (Bentzen 2018). Yet, the November 
skirmishes were different to the combined mode of operations which has led to the 
characterisation of the annexation of Crimea and the ensuing civil war in the south east of Ukraine 
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as shadowy wars (Macfarquhar 2018). NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, underlined 
the difference: Russia used military force in an open way (Sengupta 2018). Similarly, the Ukrainian 
authorities denounced the events as ‘a qualitatively different situation, a qualitatively different 
threat’ involving Russian regular forces (Macfarquhar 2018).2 
 The fuzziness over recent events in the percolating war in Ukraine has accompanied this 
security crisis since its very beginning in late 2013. At the centre of the discussion has been the 
issue of actorness with its variation, and, more importantly, conceptual and theoretical 
intractability. At a macro level, this issue taps into the now generally accepted blurring of the war-
peace distinction. Prefigured by the debates on the transformations in the character of war 
(Strachan and Scheipers, 2013), the disappearance of clearly demarcated boundaries between war 
and peace was thrust into the politico-strategic consciousness by the Russian Chief of the General 
Staff, Valery Gerasimov, and his now infamous remarks that wars are no longer declared (2013). 
At a meso level, confusion takes the form of another binary: conventional and non-conventional 
war. Of course, conventional wars have declined, and civil wars have been on the rise. Most recent 
data on armed conflict provides evidence that conventional war has virtually disappeared: ‘of the 
49 conflicts in 2017, only one was fought between states’ (Pettersson and Eck 2018, 536). In 
parallel, the rise in civil wars has led to assessments of the future of war as overwhelmingly irregular 
(Jones 2018) and predominantly Islamist in character (Walter 2018). Yet, as of 2016, the United 
States military began relearning how to fight big armies (Cooper 2016). The Trump 
administration’s National Security Strategy has also moved to identify the revisionist powers of 
China and Russia as challengers (White House 2017). As a consequence, the United States 
committed roughly 15,000 American troops to NATO’s 2018 Trident Juncture exercise in Norway 
(Cooper 2018), and closely watched Russia’s own conventional war games, Vostok, unfold across 
multiple phases during 2018.  
An increased focus on conventional warfare does not, however, simply accompany the 
future prospects of non-conventional warfare, but is said to be found in a state ‘best characterised 
by convergence’ (emphasis in original, Hoffman 2009b, 34). The West, as Seely argued, is still 
struggling to conceptualise war outside the binary discussed above (2017, 52). This is in large part 
because this dichotomous tendency is reductionist (Gray 2008-2009, 23) and suffering from what 
Tarak Barkawi called ‘Eurocentric limitation’ (2016, 200). Against this background, we have seen 
the rise of the twin notions of ‘hybrid war’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ with their multiple synonyms (Seely 
                                                     
2 The debate around the hybrid character of the Kerch straight incident requires nuance. As one thoughtful reviewer 
pointed out, while the incident itself did not amount to hybrid war, the economic context (materialised in prolonged 
economic pressure campaigns carried out through deniable means) does lead credence to labelling the incident as 
another facet of the Russian hybrid war against Ukraine. 
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2017). As early as 2005, James Mattis and Frank Hoffman started speaking of ‘hybrid war’ as a 
merger of different modes and means of war. This was later echoed by former U.S. Secretary of 
Defence, Robert M. Gates, who observed that ‘the categories of warfare are blurring and no longer 
fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see […] hybrid and more complex forms of warfare’ 
(2009).  
The term ‘hybrid’ came to encapsulate the melting of war into peace and vice versa, and 
the combination of modalities of warfare. In a hybrid scenario, competitors combine all forms of 
war and tactics simultaneously (Hoffman 2009b; Jacobs and Lasconjarias 2015, 2). The essence of 
the ‘hybrid’ label was this very issue of combining organisation and means (Hoffman 2007, 28). 
The emphasis fell on trying to link conventional with non-conventional, criminal with terrorist 
elements, and to do so across the five domains of battle: air, land, water, cyber, and space. All, of 
course, placed within a strategic context in which the military competition translates into the socio-
economic, political, and cultural. Definitions from across either side of the debate, academic or 
policy, emphasised heterogeneity and, in doing so, expanded and contracted based on how wide a 
research focus they addressed: political warfare, covert and clandestine action3, direct and indirect 
military intervention, subversion, propaganda, disinformation, electoral interference, cyber-
attacks, energy blackmail, espionage, and organised crime.  
 By focusing on how and what is combined in ‘hybrid war/warfare’, however, the debate 
largely ignored the issues of agency and actorness which this article tackles. As Hoffman makes 
clear, ‘[his] own definition […] focuses on the adversary’s modes of conflict’ (2009a). The structure 
of the definition focuses on simultaneity, fusion, and multimodality. The debate acknowledged 
early on that heterogeneity applied also to actors. General Mark A. Milley, former United States 
Army Chief of Staff, made the point very clearly: ‘[future wars] could have conventional forces, 
Special Forces, guerrillas, terrorists, criminals all mixed together in a highly complex terrain a highly 
complex terrain with the potentially high densities of civilians’ (in Cooper 2016). Hoffman’s 
definition tackled actors inasmuch as they coalesced into ‘structures’, understood as ‘combinations 
of states, non-state actors, foreign fighters’ (2009a).  
In one of the very few studies explicitly discussing the question of actors, Josef Schroefl 
and Stuart Kaufman make two important observations that identify the key puzzle concerning us 
here. On the one hand, they reiterate hybridity’s links to non-state actor variety, ‘including any 
combination of insurgent or terrorist networks; organised crime groups, social groups such as 
clans, tribes or ethnic groups; and ideologically or religiously motivated organisations’ (2014, 867). 
                                                     
3 For the purpose of clarity, covert action is understood “as activity to influence events in a plausible deniable manner” 
(Cormac and Aldrich 2016, 477). Clandestine refers to operations carried in such a way as to assure secrecy or 
concealment (DeVine and Peters, 2018). 
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On the other hand, they point to these actors being backed both covertly and overtly, and that 
these relationships are usually murky (2014, 867). The first observation identifies variation of 
actors: the adversary will be the sum of different actors. The second speaks to the issue of how 
these actors relate and interact with each other as well as external parties. These observations 
underline the puzzle the article addresses: in spite of great emphasis on acknowledging an ever-
expanding range of actors involved in hybrid campaigns, we do not know very clearly how they 
segment the battlespace through interactions with other state and non-state actors, officially or 
unofficially involved in the ensuing fighting.  
In the next section, the article draws on Schroefl and Kaufman’s observations, and 
interrogates the puzzle of the relational modalities constructing the complex franchise of violence 
being waged in hybrid war. As explained in the introduction, the focus is on the military dimension 
of the many layers of hybrid action. Isolating particular domains of hybrid activity is an emerging 
trend and the debate has improved tremendously by addressing specific issues, such as cyber-
attacks (Jensen et al 2019), or individual domains: economic (Ratsiborynska 2018), socio-cultural 
(Robinson et al 2018), and political (Kragh and A ̊sberg 2017). By contracting the scope of the 
analysis, the article answers a specific call to shift the debate onto the military element of ‘warfare’ 
(Monaghan 2016, 66). Given the dearth of research on this issue, a narrow focus allows for a more 
granular analysis, inviting nevertheless future whole-picture approaches. 
 
 
 A Typology of Actors in ‘Hybrid Warfare’ 
 
This section outlines a four-category schema aiming to capture variation across the 
multiple relationships violent non-state actors develop with regular and irregular actors in hybrid 
warfare.  So far we know that actors can be states and non-state actors. They can find themselves 
coordinated within/across battlespaces to the extent that they can become blurred into one force 
(Hoffman 2007, 8). We also know that their fighting is abetted and enabled by other non-state and 
state actors wishing to change the strategic outcome of the war. Most commonly this has been 
framed as a proxy relationship. As Lawrence Freedman noted, the role of the separatists in the 
South-East of Ukraine had some similarities with Hezbollah. Specifically, ‘they also had a state 
sponsor, which ensured that they had resources and modern weaponry, though they were more of 
a proxy for the Russian interests’ (Freedman 2017 224-225). Policymakers agreed. At a 2017 
Foreign Ministers meeting at the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
former US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, called out Russia’s sponsorship of proxies in the 
 7 
Ukraine very bluntly: ‘We should be clear about the source of this violence […] Russia is arming, 
leading, training, and fighting alongside anti-government forces’ (in Peterson 2017). A year later, 
Harry Kaiman, Chargé d’Affairs with the US Mission to the OSCE, cautioned that peace prospects 
were hindered by Russia’s arming, training, leading, and fighting alongside the separatists (2018).  
Yet proxy is only one of many strategic relations shaping the dynamics of political violence 
captured by hybrid activity, despite acting as the ‘incumbent’ descriptor for the relationships 
between regular and irregular forces. By thinking just about ‘proxies, research obfuscated the 
complexity of the strategic environment. For long, this has moved to a composite structure in 
which the fighting dyad is no longer just Side A vs Side B, but has seen multiple, strategic, 
operational, and tactical arrangements of either formal or informal character on both sides (Huber 
2002). More importantly, it has pushed to the side important considerations about the nature of 
the distribution of the monopoly of violence among actors, and the emergence of security markets 
(Branović and Chojnacki 2011) where violence is simply managed by the state (Staniland 2012). 
As Carey and Mitchell recently put it, governments often ‘settle for less than a monopoly of 
violence’ (2017, 128), with proxies being one conduit of managing this situation. Recent scholarly 
efforts have refined our understanding of proxies (Berman and Lake 2019; Rauta 2018; Waldman 
2018; Mumford 2013; Hughes 2012), delineated between proxy and auxiliary relationships (Rauta 
in Brown et al 2019, 2016; Scheipers 2015), and identified surrogacy as a standalone strategic 
relationship (Krieg and Rickli 2019; 2019; Waldman 2019; Krieg 2016; Hughes and Tripodi 2009). 
The complexity of the consumption and management of violence in contemporary settings, and 
the differences between proxies, auxiliaries, and surrogates are relevant to the hybrid warfare 
debate. These insights were facilitated by a shift in conflict research on the micro dynamics of 
political violence with a keen focus on the integrated study of militias and rebel groups (Jentzsch 
et al 2015, 755).  
Research acknowledged that a wide range of non-state armed actors were being employed 
to act clandestinely for objectives that regular forces were unwilling or unable to achieve and as a 
rational means to govern and control (Davies 2009, 222; Schlichte 2009, 247). With a focus on 
paramilitaries, Ariel Ahram argued that states find multiple ways to accommodate the persistence 
of non-state actor (2011), and Carey et al. analysed how and why states may use militias as a way 
to delegate certain types of violence against civilians (2015; Cohen and Nordås 2015; Eck 2015; 
Forney 2015). Drawing on Carey et al.’s differentiation between informal and semi-official pro-
governmental militias (2013), Aliyev distinguished between ‘state-manipulated’ and ‘state-parallel’ 
militias (2016), and Paul Staniland determined that states have ideology-driven and ‘often 
unexpected relationships with non-state armed groups’ (2015a: 771). He explained that these actors 
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can occupy an ally, enemy, or grey zone ideological space and, elsewhere categorised the role of 
militias in elections (2015b). Drawing on this debate, the article presents a taxonomy of strategic 
relationships between regular and irregular, official and unofficial actors segmenting the military 
domain of hybrid activity. Thinking typologically provides the advantage of simplicity by 
presenting a theoretically productive way of capturing phenomena diversity. It offers a trade-off 
which is not without analytical costs, and previous efforts to classify have been criticised for failing 
to account for factors with significant consequences, such as mode of operation (Clayton and 
Thomas 2016, 500).  
The proposed classification is informed by two considerations - relational embeddedness and 
relational morphology – as described in Figure 1, and detailed in Figure 2. I present relational 
embeddedness as a way of capturing the degree to which the pursuit of coercive goals is done 
solely by/through the irregular or in cooperation with/alongside regular forces. The emphasis on the 
distinction between ‘by/through’ and ‘in cooperation with/alongside’ taps into the framing used 
to explain the emerging model of collaborative fighting involving local armed non-state actors, 
conceptualised by the US armed forces as the ‘by, with, and through’ (BTW) approach. As General 
Joseph L. Votel explains, the approach involved operations “led by [our] partner, state or non-
state, with enabling support from the Unites States or U.S.-led coalitions, and through U.S. 
authorities and partner agreements” (emphasis in original, Votel and Keravuori, 2018). The role, 
aims, and employment of non-state actors in the BTW approach speak to a different strategic 
context than hybrid warfare and their similarities and differences should be assessed separately. 
However, what is relevant to my conceptualisation of embeddedness is the logic of describing and 
pursuing relationships through functional identification. This has also been applied by Böhmelt 
and Clayton to distinguish between paramilitaries and pro-governmental militias (2016). 
Embeddedness, therefore, becomes a measure of the interactivity of the mode of operations 
employed towards reaching the desired strategic ends. It is not an indicator of the complexity of 
relationship nor of the control mechanisms underlying it (Bowen 2019). Simply put, 
embeddedness describes the structural relationship between regulars and irregulars, and the 
‘by/through’, ‘in cooperation with/alongside’ pairing enables distinguishing between direct and 
indirect embeddedness, which form the first classificatory criterion.  
 
[INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2. HERE] 
 
The second criterion is that of relational morphology. In a recent article, Ahram 
complained that research on the varieties of relationships between state and non-state actors is 
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hindered by the application of Principal-Agent theory and its logic of delegation. He called for 
future etiological mechanisms to move beyond this framework (2016). Relational morphology 
attempts this by distinguishing between supplementary and delegatory pathways of relationship 
constitution. Supplementary morphology identifies a relationship in which the non-state actor 
element provides a complementary, additive value through combination. This is in contrast to the 
delegatory one in which the irregular replaces the regular entirely through substitution. Together, 
relational embeddedness and relational morphology delineate four patterns of interactions – 
‘proxy’, ‘auxiliary’, ‘surrogates’, and ‘affiliated’ – which I discuss next in reference to the Ukrainian 
case in a theory-building effort. The case study presents sufficient variation to help delineate 
theoretically the proposed schema given the arrays of volunteers, mercenaries, gangs, criminals, 
self-defence forces and militias, and their multiple modes of interaction (Galeotti 2016, 285). 
 
Auxiliary Forces  
 
The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia followed the wave of violent protests, 
which started in Kiev in November 2013 and which led to the removal of Viktor Yanukovych’s 
regime. The situation emerged against the backdrop of long-standing tensions in Ukraine over its 
relationship to both the European Union and the Russian Federation (Freedman 2014; Rauta and 
Mumford in Dover et al 2017). As discussed above, the operation was soon referred to as ‘hybrid 
warfare’, as it involved disinformation, political disruption and propaganda. Concerning the 
military dimension, the hybrid operations combined Russian Special Forces and local self-defence 
militias. The latter played ‘largely an auxiliary role’ (Galeotti 2016, 284-295; Rauta 2016), and as 
such represent the first type of regular-irregular relationship: auxiliary.  
Auxiliaries have often been labelled as ‘unlawful’ and have received scholarly attention 
especially in the context of counterinsurgency (Rauta in Brown et al 2019, 2016; Scheipers, 2015). 
The expanded typology presented in Figure 1, allows us to define auxiliary forces as armed groups 
that are not part of the regular forces but that are directly embedded into the structure of fighting operating in 
collaboration with or alongside regulars. Their relationship to the regular takes a supplementary form 
with the groups providing additive value through combination. Combination underlines a pattern 
of strategic collaboration and association: non-sequential arrangement and rearrangement of 
militia activities in support of and with regular forces. Auxiliaries, therefore, act as force multipliers, 
in defensive or offensive roles, accompanying or being accompanied by regulars in operation. They 
identify a collusion pathway of working jointly towards coercive ends. As Scheipers argues, they 
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are simply military forces that support the military efforts of regular armed forces of the state 
(2015).  
In Crimea, the auxiliaries contributed to activities ranging from organising and 
participating in pro-Russian protests to roadblocking and other efforts designed to enforce the 
takeover of the peninsula. As events unravelled, for example, they blocked access to OSCE military 
observers and prevented pro-Kiev manifestations. The mobilisation of auxiliaries was carried out 
by groups such as the Night Wolves, the famous biker gang locally lead by Dmitry Sinichkin (Salem 
2014) and involved Afghan War veterans, with Frantz Klintsevich playing an important role. 
Reports by the OSCE added Cossacks to the mix (Walker 2014), and self-defence militias 
expanded across the peninsula. The disbandment of the ruthless Berkut police force by the new 
authorities in Kiev provided much-needed manpower and expertise to these militias. Adding to 
this, was Crimea’s long history of criminality, turf wars, and gangs. The powerful criminal 
undertones of the auxiliaries should not distract from their role as military auxiliaries. As Galeotti 
explains in a new study of the relationship between organised crime and Russian politics, in 
Crimea, ‘the criminals were combatants, not just collaborators’ (2018b, 243). Interviews with 
militia leaders capture this very aspect, as well as their operation alongside and under regular forces 
command. One such leader, Vladimir Melnik, described his militia as peaceful yet ‘military people’ 
following received orders (Salem and Walker 2014). As such, the category of auxiliary draws on 
the battlefield collaboration between irregular and regular and feeds into a long conversation on 
their strategic utility (Andres et al 2005/2006; Rauta in Brown et al 2019). It also adds more 
specificity to comparisons with ‘compound warfare’ understood as the intentional and 
simultaneous use of regular main force with dispersed irregular forces (Huber 2002). ‘Auxiliary’ 
moves beyond the point of synergy to capture a wider remit of kinetic purposes (Rauta 2016), 




As mentioned above, the category of ‘proxy’ is the one the literature has referenced and 
explored the most. To explain the role of proxies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, we have 
to shift away from Crimea and onto the violence in the South-East of Ukraine. From the very start 
of the crisis, the intended strategic outcome for the region desired by Russia was different to that 
for Crimea. If Crimea was to be part of the Russian Federation, the South-East was to be 
transformed into a frozen conflict much like the one in Transnistria. This translated in the role 
and relationship to non-state actors as well: their role was not just military as it was with the 
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auxiliaries, but also politico-strategic (Rauta 2016). As opposed to a covert direct military 
intervention, Russia waged an indirect, proxy war. The latter has been defined as ‘the polarisation 
of competing political goals between two organised parties, a Beneficiary and a Target, in which 
at least one party engages the other indirectly in sustained collective violence through a third party, 
the Proxy’ (Rauta 2018, 457).  
Following this definition, I conceptualise proxy forces as armed groups that are not part of 
regular forces but that fight for and on behalf of states wishing to alter the strategic outcome of a conflict while 
remaining external to it. The proxy is indirectly embedded with the external state in as much as it 
becomes their conduit of armed violence on the basis of state’s provision of a range of support. 
As such, they are not part of the regular forces and they operate by entirely replacing the regular 
forces on the battlefield. Looking at Figure 1, the specificity of the proxy category is determined 
by the armed groups becoming the forces through which the regulars fight, in a strategic 
relationship resulting from the regulars’ delegation of war to the irregulars (Salehyan 2010). This 
relationship is by no means linear and unidirectional, it can diverge (Brown 2016, 247). Salehyan 
et al (2011) presented this as a joint venture in which the external state must be willing to offer 
support and the group must be willing to accept it. More recently, San-Akca presented selection 
mechanisms between the parties (2016), and Rauta developed a goal-preference explanation (2018, 
457).  
The self-defence militias in the South East emerged from weak political projects such as 
the Ukrainian Front (Wilson, 2014). With Russian backing they transformed in separatist rebels 
fighting for various degrees of autonomy, independence, and unification with Russia. Their 
warfighting took, or tried to take, a distinctly conventional style but their opportunism and lack of 
training and experience led to minor successes (Savage 2018). The referendums of independence 
in Luhansk and Donbas produced two unrecognised people’s republics, and the advance of the 
Ukrainian forces required Russian direct involvement which took place in August 2014 when the 
Kremlin sent in approximatively 4000 regular troops (Savage 2018, 83). The proxy gamble failed 
for Russia as it presumed it could fight an undeclared war cheaply with local militias, and it created 
‘a situation in which it was often scarcely in control of its notional proxies’ (Galeotti 2018b, 247). 
As Savage (2018, 84) described, proxies were purged and reduced to ‘a buffer and a screening 





As Figure 1 shows, the category of ‘affiliated forces’ tries to identify a strategic relationship 
based, much like in the case of proxies, on delegation of violence by regulars external to the conflict 
whose outcome they seek to alter. In contrast to proxies, however, affiliated forces are directly 
embedded, working ‘in collaboration/alongside’ regulars, often in murky arrangements which 
challenge easy attribution of action in the battlefield. I define affiliated forces as armed groups that 
are unofficially part of the regular forces, and that fight for and on behalf of states wishing to alter the strategic 
outcome of a conflict while remaining external to it.  Affiliated forces have a symbiotic, formal, yet legally 
dubious relationship with the state acting as an invisible arm.  
Affiliated forces capture the rise of violent non-state actors for whom the battlefield 
presents opportunities of profit-maximisation and revenue accumulation. This is specifically the 
case for mercenaries and shadowy private military and security contractors. Sean McFate’s recent 
study on the modern mercenary distinguishes between mercenaries and military enterprisers. The 
latter were defined as ‘private business entities that deliver to consumers a wide spectrum of 
military and security services, once generally assumed to be exclusively inside the public context’ 
(Singer 2003, 8). The former, however, are private armies that can ‘conduct autonomous military 
campaigns, offensive operations, and force projection’ (McFate 2017, 14). 
The contracting of warfare was evident during the violence in the south east of Ukraine 
and captured what Deborah Avant called external force projection (2005). The commodification 
of armed conflict in Russia has a long history (Sukhankin 2019), and is intertwined with the Russian 
programme of modernisation of its armed forces. More importantly, as Christopher Spearin 
argued, the ‘relationship […] is quite intimate’ (2018, 42), functioning technically as an arm of the 
state. From the point of view of the typology’s relational embeddedness, this comes under its direct 
category. Sukhankin argues that they are on an equal footing with the regulars, yet kept separate 
through their de facto illegal status (2019). Marten observed recently that the groups are used in 
conjunction with Russian military forces (2019). This is why as a distinct category, affiliated forces 
manage to work, rather oxymoronically, in collaboration with regulars external to the conflict. For 
this reason, the proposed schema presents affiliated forces as strategically subordinated to the 
external state and its regular forces, assuming roles and responsibilities that offer it deniability and 
shield regulars from backlash. The veil of deniability functions, however, like an open secret and 
there have been disagreements resulting from the unrecognised subordination of such non-state 
actors. Evgeny Shabayev, the leader of a paramilitary organisation known as the Khovrino Cossack 
Society, active in Ukraine, has called for social benefits and better legal protections for Russia’s 
private military contractors (Ilyusgina et al 2018).  
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Yet, most mercenary activities in Ukraine coalesce around the Wagner Group, a shadowy 
mercenary group now thought to be active in Syria, Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic 
(Brown 2018). The mercenary group boats the features of the proposed category. Peter MacKay, 
the former Canadian Defence Minister, holds the group responsible for extraterritorial work on 
behalf of Russia without Kremlin attribution (in Giglio 2019). Similarly, former U.K. Defence 
Secretary Gavin Williamson spoke of the Wagner Group as allowing ‘the Kremlin to get away with 
murder while denying blood on their hands’ (in Shuster 2019). The range of activities was wide. 
The first Wagner soldiers who appeared in Ukraine were specialists who worked under the 
direction of handlers in the Russian defence ministry, according to the country’s domestic 
intelligence agency, the Security Service of Ukraine. The fighting was done by a mix of locally 
recruited and foreign fighters, with the Wagner Group boosting an all-Serbian platoon. In July 
2018, Ukraine presented to the International Court of Justice a list of foreign fighters linked to the 
Wagner Group that were actively engaged in the Donbas region (UAWIRE, 2018). Wagner was 
also employed to train and aide proxy rebels while also acting as an enforcer of control (Giglio 
2019), assassinating rebel leaders such as Alexander Bednov, the LPR’s so-called Minister of 
Defence, or Aleksey Mozgovoy, the leader of the Prizrak Brigade (Sukhankin 2018). Deploying 
Wagner as a mechanism of proxy control underscores the relevance of different types of 
relationships between regular and irregular forces in the battlespace. The Ukrainian Security 
Service (SBU) linked the use of private violence to ‘hybrid warfare’, identifying the Wager group 
as an instrument of ‘Russia's hybrid aggression against the rest of the world’. In parallel to this, 
Assistant to President Putin, Vladislav Surkov, was responsible for the creation of a mercenary 
group called the Union of Donbass Volunteers (Sukhankin 2019). The group is directly linked to 
the Russian authorities and became a tool for managing volunteers in the Donbass region. Their 
fighting involved working with groups such as the Union of Russian Troopers, Union of Afghan 
Veterans, and Cossack organisations, whilst cooperating with a pro-Russian organisation abroad: 
the Union of Serbian Veterans and Volunteers; 63rd Brigade; or National Union of Volunteers 
(Lisunov et al. 2017). By presenting the category of ‘affiliated forces’, the schema captures the 
commerce-warfighting linkages of the military domain of ‘hybrid warfare’. The links between 
affiliated forces and proxy forces point to the need to expand our theoretical thinking about the 





The last category is that of ‘surrogate forces’. With it, the schema integrates a new turn in 
the study of third parties in warfare, namely the rise of ‘surrogate warfare’. One of the earliest 
academic observations drew a distinction between surrogates, auxiliaries, and proxies. The latter 
included third parties ‘employed by a state in any external conflict where the employment of its 
own forces may be deemed undesirable’ (Hughes and Tripodi 2009, 3). Auxiliaries referred to 
forces working alongside regulars in inter-state warfare (Hughes and Tripodi 2009, 3). Surrogates, 
on the other hand, were pro-governmental groups or militias ‘utilised in an internal war between 
a government and armed opposition’ and that were ‘aligned with the government but not formally 
part of it’ (Hughes and Tripodi 2009, 4/5).  
More recently, Andreas Krieg expanded the definition of surrogacy by linking it to the 
externalisation of the burden of war to ‘human and technological surrogates’ (2016, 97). In their 
recent monograph, Krieg and Rickli argue that ‘the uniqueness of surrogate warfare lies not so 
much in the departure from conventional trinitarian means of warfare but in its nature as 
nontrinitarian socio-political phenomenon’ (2019). Drawing on this, the schema proposes its final 
category of ‘surrogate forces’ as armed groups through which regular forces of the state involved in the ongoing 
conflict fights (either by being partially supplemented or wholly replaced). Surrogates are indirectly embedded 
in light of their operational-tactical interaction with the regulars: taking over the burden of fighting 
as a response to the inability of the state to assert the monopoly of violence. This should not be 
confused with the legal developments through which paramilitaries are slowly integrated into the 
regular force. As Malyarenko and Galbreath observed, initially, the Ukrainian government 
supported the paramilitary battalions informally, retaining formal distance (2016). 
Surrogates are different to the other aforementioned categories because they observe a 
relationship not with external states wishing to change the outcome of the conflict, but with the 
very state whose authority is contested through violence. Faced with a chronically underfunded 
military that had for a long time been neglected and subjected to the country’s rampant corruption, 
the Ukrainian defence establishment found itself unable to present even the slightest response to 
the Russian aggression in Crimea and the ensuing separatist violence in Ukraine. The answer was 
volunteer paramilitaries. Very early on, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence issued official decrees 
to create paramilitary formations to supplement the Army and the National Guard. What was 
unique was that funding for such groups was almost entirely private. It was crowdfunded through 
the Volunteer Council, a civil group within the Ministry of Defence (Weiss 2015). Paramilitary 
groups and self-defence militias grew quickly. The Ukrainian Volunteer Army, the Aidar battalion, 
the Azov and Donbas battalions, Right Sector, Dnipro-1, and the Organisation of Ukrainian 
Nationals are some of the most famous. Recent research points to there being around 40 to 50 of 
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such groups (Aliyev 2016). Their military performance was mixed and their connection to Nazi 
ideology raised more problems than providing solutions. The fact that some of these groups were 
absorbed in the official structures of the armed forces emphasises the dependence of the regular 
forces on these groups, through which significant fighting was carried out. This was the case of 
the Azov and Donbas battalions which were legally incorporated into the National Guard (Aliyev 
2016, 509). The Right Sector was included in the Ministry of Defence. Surrogates present a final 
window into understanding the complexity of the kinetic battlefield in hybrid warfare. We need to 
talk about these not merely as combatants engaging enemy formation, but also as engaging 
morphologically similar actors. Insubordination, private agendas, and paramilitary rivalries and 
feuds all divert and add layers of violence which shape the battlefield. By trying to distinguish their 
role and interactions surrogate forces occupy an important space in the spectrum presented here 




The article presented a typology of non-state actors in hybrid warfare by taking into 
account their relationships with regular state forces, external or internal to the conflict. In doing 
so, it devoted special attention to the kinetic domain of hybrid warfare following a recent trend 
towards disaggregating the many layers of hybrid activity. Understanding these regular-irregular 
relationships as involving proxy, auxiliary, surrogate, and affiliated forces adds greater specificity 
to a problem which, in spite being central to a vociferous debate, has escaped so far classificatory 
and theoretical efforts. The four categories act as custodians of ideal types which attempt to make 
sense of complex, and often murky, strategic environments. As Carey and Mitchell pointed out 
recently, ‘exhaustive, exclusive, and meaningful categories are hard to find’, and categorising ‘is 
empirically as well as normatively contested terrain’ (2017, 130). The same holds for the theoretical 
efforts of this paper. David Sterman recently quoted Norman Roule, a CIA veteran and former 
National Intelligence Manager for Iran at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, who 
argued that 'one of the difficult words that is often thrown around is proxy. If you want to have 
analysts or think tanks work themselves into a frazzle, ask them the definition—the difference 
between proxy, surrogate, and partner—and come back four days later and see who’s still moving 
on the floor' (2019). Nevertheless, the ideal types presented here serve to point to the multiple 
dynamics of violence. They attempt to contribute to this empirical maze of variations of regular-
irregular relationships which so far have been reduced to just proxyship. As Scheipers put it, the 
task of experts is to present policymakers with the vocabulary necessary to have an informed 
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debate (2015). The taxonomical effort developed here yields significant returns, which are able to 
inform both the academic and policy debate on the future developments of hybrid warfare.  
First, a clearer grasp on the actor relationships and their shaping of the conflict space 
cumulatively brings together four current directions of inquiry into contemporary war and warfare. 
The literatures on proxies, auxiliaries, and surrogates address key questions by interrogating 
variation in the delegation of war to non-state actors, which the emergent hybrid war literature 
captures as empirical puzzles. Given the propensity of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ to diffuse 
across issues ranging from intelligence and propaganda to cyber war, a cumulative perspective 
helps knowledge progress successfully. Having embedded the typology in the wider literature on 
paramilitaries and pro-governmental militias demonstrates that the hybrid debate should not be 
divorced from the wider study of political violence. 
Second, an actor-centred classification is a welcomed effort in light of myriad of actors 
involved in hybrid warfare. Recently, Julie Fedor introduced the category of ‘active celebrity 
combatant’ and explored the case of Zakhar Prilepin as a conduit for ‘the normalisation of war 
and violence more broadly in Russian popular culture and public life’ (2019, 19). Similarly, Mark 
Galeotti spoke of the Kremlin’s latest hybrid warfare assets, namely gangs, thugs, and gangsters 
(2018b). These add to other dimensions such as the political mobilisation of the Russian oligarchy 
as a tool in hybrid war and the recent ‘weaponization’ of the Russian Orthodox Church as a 
conduit and lobby for Russian greatness. As the American debate moves increasingly towards 
discussing grey zone as opposed to the hybrid concept,4 and Galeotti invites scholars and 
practitioners to move beyond the hybrid debate (2019). This article anchored a problem which is 
as important as the cyber, informational, or socio-economic dimensions of hybrid activity. In fact, 
the article’s limitations result from not drawing links to these other dimensions, which is something 
future research should do and, more importantly, outside of the Ukrainian context.  
From this point of view, the article invites future research to address not just pending 
questions but think creatively in terms of puzzles. The article identified different types of actors 
with different roles in warfare by focusing on the strategic relationship they enter into with regular 
state forces. One potential puzzle drawn from here is to think about why some of these externally 
supported rebels decided to fight conventionally, and not irregularly. Hew Strachan noted early on 
in the hybrid debate that ‘hybrid war is already being used to embrace not only a war in which 
regular and irregular actors take part, but also hybrid actors in a war who might opt to fight a 
regular war rather than an irregular one’ (2009, 22). Several of the Russian supported forces 
                                                     
4 I am thankful to the reviewers for drawing my attention to the epistemological shifts and differences between the 
American debate, on one hand, and the British-European, on the other. 
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fashioned and attempted to fight in clearly conventional ways, yet some did not. Added to this are 
questions of performance, and whether external support professionalises these self-militias and, if 
so, at what cost. The many puzzles surrounding hybrid war/warfare point to there being significant 
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